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Abstract 
Gone are the days when inflation fears had receded under years 
of “Great Moderation” in macroeconomics. The US subprime 
financial crisis, the ensuing “Great Recession” and the sovereign 
debt scares that spread throughout much of the industrialized 
world brought about a new order characterized by higher 
inflation volatility, severe commodity price shocks and 
uncertainty over sovereign bond creditworthiness to name just a 
few. All of which tend to put in jeopardy both conventional 
inflation protected strategies and nominal unhedged ones: from 
reduced issues of linkers to negative long-term real rates, they 
call into question the viability of current strategies. This paper 
investigates those game changing events and their asset liability 
management consequences for retail and institutional investors. 
Three alternative ways to achieve real value protection are 
proposed. 
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The drivers of inflation hedging 
Inflation hedgers worldwide can be divided between those that are compelled by law or 
contract to do so and those who choose to do so as an investment strategy: in the first category 
we will find institutional investors such as British pension funds, which have to offer 
pensioners a guaranteed real value for their retirements, and, in the second category, we will 
find their American peers which choose to offer real return targets to their investors. As 
economic realities cannot be written in black and white, we will find a swarm of investors in 
the middle ground which are somewhat driven by imperative and partly driven by strategy: 
this last category includes French retail banks hedging their inflation-linked retail savings 
products or insurers which offer policies that, by law, are guaranteeing real values. As both of 
these are exposed to short-run inflation liabilities, they have the option not to fully hedge this 
inflation and therefore keep the risk on their books. This combination of imperative and 
strategic decisions has generated a massive influx of money into inflation hedging assets 
which could be defined as “too many dollars chasing too few [securities]”. This steady 
increase in the demand for inflation hedging assets as inflation remains muted overall begs for 
an answer. 
As Volcker’s monetary tightening drive in the late seventies took its toll on the rampant 
inflationary pressures in the US economy, the “Great Inflation” era seemed to have come to a 
close (Meltzer, 2005). But as investors were ushered into a new era of receding inflation and 
overall macroeconomic stabilization, the days of cheap oil were numbered: emerging 
economies were showing signs of economic take-off.  
 
Exhibit 1: Crude oil and inflation over forty years in the US 
 
 
As those countries transformed their economies and caught-up with more advanced ones, so 
did their oil consumption. Depressed oil prices in the decades following the oil shocks 
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(Mabro, 1987) as a result of both economic difficulties (Hamilton, 2011) and large offshore 
discoveries in the eighties led to a dramatic underinvestment in oil production whose 
consequences would only be felt at the end of the noughties: an ever rising demand became 
no match for the growth in production. As the financial cataclysm hit the world’s most 
advanced economies, crude oil prices returned to a high and volatile state, driving inflation 
upward in most countries and threatening to annihilate any timid sign of economic recovery. 
Throughout this period, the very nature of inflation drivers had changed as headline inflation 
indices faced a roller-coaster ride of a very different nature from the one experienced in the 
seventies (Blanchard & Gali, 2007): core inflation was now flat for every advanced economy 
(van den Noord & André, 2007) and (Clark & Terry, 2010).  
 
Exhibit 2: Real sovereign 10 year yields for France, the UK and the US 
 
 
The subprime crisis and the ensuing “Great Recession” (Farmer, 2011) have had a 
lasting impact in the form of depressed economic activity and non-existent wage increases 
contemporaneously with inflation creeping upward (Levanon, Chen, & Cheng, 2012). While 
the effects of the non-conventional monetary policies implemented in the wake of the 
financial crises have not yet shown any clear signs in terms of inflationary activity, negative 
long-term real rates became a pressing reality for asset liability managers: the dangers posed 
by ever growing unhedged inflation liabilities seem all the more acute as constantly increasing 
flows of investors spooked by the surge in inflation and the financial market crash sought 
inflation protection. There are few reasons for this demand to abate as the populations in 
advanced economies age while seemingly being unable to reform their increasingly fragile 
redistributive pension systems, the consequences of which will most probably be an increase 
in the demand for private pension schemes, which have embedded purchasing power 
guarantees, synonymous of inflation protection (Zhang, Korn, & Ewald, 2007). As the 
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prospect of stable and moderate inflation fades, with it vanishes the underpinning of inflation-
linked bond issues by sovereign states. As the macroeconomic paradigm shifts and the future 
of the primary inflation-linked market is challenged, the time to rethink inflation hedging has 
come. 
 
The conventional portfolio allocation to hedge inflation 
Gold has remained largely synonymous with inflation protection for centuries if not 
millennia. Wars, empires, industrial revolutions, gold standard, stock market and real estate 
bubbles and crashes came and went but the magic of gold remained largely intact. 
Unsurprisingly therefore, time passed without burnishing the real value of the yellow metal 
which to this day maintains its position as the grail of real value (Dempster & Artigas, 2010). 
But gold itself is not immune to boom and bust phenomena. Even though gold’s very long-
term inflation hedging properties are undeniable, its propensity to attract feverish investor 
confidence, especially in time of economic turmoil, makes it a highly unsuitable asset to 
hedge inflation when it comes to accounting or as a guarantee of purchasing power. While 
gold remained the asset of choice for state coffers then central banks with infinite horizon, the 
same logic cannot apply to individual investors as J.M. Keynes famously remarked: “In the 
long run we are all dead”. Through one’s lifetime, the value of gold will have gone up or 
down and will take years if not decades before a correction occurs, which is most likely 
substantially longer than our desired investment horizon. 
 
Exhibit 3: Real and nominal gold prices over fifty years. 
 
 
Hardly a week goes by without an article on a new inflation hedging asset class or a 
new allocation technique. But in truth, there is no more a magic inflation hedging allocation 
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than there is a silver bullet: inflation is solely linked to explicitly inflation-linked securities 
such as linked bonds or swaps. All other asset classes have only time-varying hedging 
capabilities and therefore offer limited protection (Attié & Roache, 2009). Linked bonds have 
accordingly become the core of inflation hedging literature and make up the bulk of inflation 
hedged portfolios today (Bodie Z. , 1988). Yet, this one and only solution remains 
unsatisfactory for many investors: linked bonds are available in limited supply and 
accordingly suffer from low returns and less than optimal liquidity and depth compared to 
their nominal equivalents (D’Amico, Kim, & Wei, 2008). This is partly due to the fact that 
more than thirty years after their introduction in the United Kingdom, the issuance of private 
linked bonds has remained largely marginal and therefore confined to a few sovereign or 
quasi-sovereign issuers (Garcia & Van Rixtel, 2007). The problem has become all the more 
acute as the current sovereign crisis has raised credible questions on the opportunity for 
sovereign issuers to stick to their real issue policy in the face of rising costs as inflation crept 
up and long-term real rates, which have turned negative, have become the norm for many 
large nominal sovereign issuers. 
 
Exhibit 4: The share of linkers in sovereign issues for France, the UK and the US 
 
 
As good times bring on bad habits, the “Great Moderation” era (Stock & Watson, 
2003) of the decades preceding the subprime crises was no exception. This period witnessed 
an exceptional context of low and stable inflation which progressively relaxed the inflationary 
fears of the seventies and smothered memories of the high and volatile inflation which had 
characterized it. Rising inflation volatility at the turn of the last decade brought back those 
fears believed to be long lost and resulted in a new wave of interest in inflation protection. 
But the most pernicious effect of this new context was yet to come as nominal rates went 
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down contemporaneously with inflation shooting up: purely nominal un-hedged strategies 
started to backfire dangerously and required a profound rethink of their use. Moreover, as 
central banks all over the OECD countries started to implement unconventional monetary 
tools and expand their balance sheets, there were fears that the problem could only get worse 
as quantitative easing and Twists become household names (Baumeister & Benati, 2010). 
This new investment climate motivated researchers to move into a new era of alternative 
hedging strategies that would neither be linker based nor dependent on a macroeconomic 
moderation hypothesis that had shown its limits. 
 
Moving away from linkers with portfolio inflation insurance 
One of the most enduring testimonies of the financial meltdown brought about by the 
subprime mortgage crisis in the US can be found in the elevated level of risk aversion 
worldwide (Caceres, Guzzo, & Segoviano Basurto, 2010). The ensuing European sovereign 
crisis only fueled an additional flight to quality syndrome which had gripped investors fleeing 
the hazardous combination of an equity bear market of historic proportions and the first 
significant spikes in headline inflation for at least two decades. The combination of both of 
these factors resulted in increased demand for at least inflation protected investments, if not 
theoretically nominal and real risk-free products, namely investment grade linkers. But the 
rise in the demand for them was not to be matched by an equivalent rise in their issuance as 
sovereign treasuries were themselves battling with rising financing costs precisely as a result 
of this inflation linkage. The very raison d’être of linkers had backfired badly as they turned 
out to be more expensive to issue than their nominal counterparts in times of rising inflation. 
This inevitably leads to the return of the question that had plagued inflation protection 
research in its nascent phase: the availability problem of linkers. 
Considering the overwhelming debt overhang problem which looms over most 
sovereign issuers from industrialized countries, it is becoming increasingly clear that inflation 
will eventually be the last available weapon left in the state’s arsenal to fight bulging balance-
sheets. Resorbing debt through monetary erosion will probably lead to a revision of sovereign 
issue policies which could in turn lead to some reduction in the share of linkers in new issues 
if not an outright reduction in their output. By the look of issues in the last couple of years, 
this policy shifting is in fact probably already underway. Yet, the foreseeable scarcity of new 
inflation-linked bonds could be bypassed if we were capable of replicating linkers with purely 
nominal assets which would also have inflation hedging capacities (Brennan & Xia, 2002). 
There is a large body of literature on natural inflation hedging assets (Amenc, Martellini, & 
Ziemann, 2009) such as commodities or listed real estate (REITs) which delves into their 
potential resilience to both expected and unexpected inflation shocks and their ex-ante 
optimal allocation in inflation hedging portfolios. But none of these alternative asset classes 
has a guaranteed value at maturity or even a real (and nominal) floor like linkers do. 
Moreover, as most of the demand for inflation hedging assets comes from asset-liability-
management desks, it adds another layer of complexity as they require not only a real floor 
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but also a certain level of real return to match part of their funding costs. Clearly, not all of 
these requirements can be met simultaneously, but a mitigation approach can be found in the 
application of portfolio insurance (Leland, 1980) to our problem. 
This asset management classic from the seventies is transposed into real asset protection 
in the form of the Dynamic Inflation Hedging Trading Strategy (DIHTS) derived from 
Constant Proportion Portfolio Insurance (CPPI). This new framework developed in (Fulli-
Lemaire, A Dynamic Inflation Hedging Trading Strategy, 2012) envisages the inclusion of 
strong real return yielding assets with high volatility ones like Equities, Commodities and 
REITs to hedge a fundamentally low inflation volatility risk. It enables the real upside of 
these alternative assets to be captured, while significantly limiting the downside risk. The 
intrinsic limit of this strategy would be the persistence of negative long-term real rates which 
impede the inception of the strategy. This is unfortunately the case in the current investment 
environment, in which the combination of low nominal rates as a result of non-conventional 
monetary policies, coupled with temporarily higher than officially targeted inflation, are 
yielding negative real rates until very long maturities. This approach has been extended by 
(Graf, Haertel, Kling, & Ruß, 2012) in their optimal product design under inflation risk for 
financial planning. 
 
A global macro approach to allocate commodities 
The decade long commodity bull-run which came to a close in the summer of 2008 had 
seen crude oil prices breach the psychological barrier of one hundred dollars a barrel for the 
first time in current value since the two oil shocks of the seventies (Baffes & Haniotis, 2010). 
The ensuing “Great Recession” brought an abrupt end to a decade which witnessed the rise of 
emerging countries, whose growing commodity consumption had spurred their prices to 
reached unprecedented peace-time levels. Commodities had become known as the inflation 
hedging crisis-robust alternative investment class of choice. By 2012, more than 400 billion 
dollars of commodities had found their way into investors’ portfolios, a more than tenfold 
increase in a decade according to a Barclays commodity survey (Barclays Capital, 2012). 
Their appeal only momentarily waned as losses on commodity investments mounted during 
the recession-induced global fall in demand and lost their luster as the investment class which 
had withstood the first part of the financial crisis unscathed. Contrarian’s triumph was short 
lived as a combination of government intervention to support growth in emerging countries, 
persistent geopolitical tensions throughout the Middle East and resurging concerns on the 
timing of peak oil rapidly hit back at the bear run and promptly sent the Brent benchmark 
crude index hovering back above $100 a barrel.  As recession gripped Europe and slowing 
growth worldwide took their toll on industrial metals, demand for agricultural commodities 
climbed as droughts, floods, and conflicts damaged crops and stocks. As in all turbulent 
times, demand for precious metals soared. 
The underlying motive behind commodities’ pivotal role in inflation protected portfolio 
allocations, apart from their obvious high risk-high reward profile, begs for an answer which 
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is to be found in the nature of the relationship between investable asset classes and inflation. 
When it comes to inflation linkage, they can be separated into inflation-driving and inflation-
driven ones. On the one hand, as commodity price changes feed directly into inflation and, 
conversely, cash rate hikes counteract it when they are used as monetary policy tools, they 
both naturally qualify as inflation drivers. On the other hand, since bond investment dwindles 
under rising inflation or, inversely, real estate investments should go up as rents adjust to 
inflation, it firmly anchors them in the inflation-driven side of our categorization of 
investment classes. It is worth noting that equities also mostly behave as inflation-driven 
assets even if its impact seems particularly investment-horizon dependent: as they are stores 
of relative value, which entitles their holders to the share of a real assets’ cash flows, they 
should be inflation neutral at the long end as nominal cash flows gradually adjust to inflation 
over time, but should be negatively impacted in the short run until the inflation adjustment 
takes place. 
 
Exhibit 5: Commodities before and after the Great Recession 
 
 
From a portfolio protection point of view, investing in inflation-driving assets seems the 
prudent choice as they should perform better at hedging inflation risk in both the short and the 
long end, therefore providing investors with an inflation-protected liquidity option on their 
investment at any time. Commodities thus arose as the potentially lucrative real-return 
yielding alternative asset class even if their price variations are significantly more volatile 
than those of the liability benchmark they are intended to outperform (Bodie Z. , 1983). In this 
context, are current allocation techniques performing satisfactorily or should we endeavor to 
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find a radically new approach that would take into account the inflation driving factor? (Fulli-
Lemaire, An Inflation Hedging Strategy with Commodities: A Core Driven Global Macro, 
2013) goes down this path in applying advances in macroeconomics to achieve an efficient 
allocation. 
 
Exhibit 6: The evolving correlation between commodities and inflation in the US  
 
 
As commodity prices rose, economic agents’ perception of their impact on inflation 
seems to have amplified. Indeed, their increasing influence on the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI), a proxy measure for headline inflation, has been extensively documented by 
econometricians and macroeconomists in the last two decades (Blanchard & Gali, 2007). It 
appears that around the mid-nineties a macroeconomic paradigm shifting began to unfold in 
the following way: while the pass-through of exogenous commodity price shocks into 
headline inflation increased by a half, the equivalent pass-through into core inflation seems to 
have ceased. While these results should have profound implications for liability-driven 
commodity investors, there is still a clear gap in the literature on this subject as no one seems 
to have exposed the financial implications in terms of allocation technique those economists 
have paved the way for. This is especially true of the link between investable commodities 
and inflation liabilities: we therefore proceed toward our macro-driven allocation by first 
evidencing a link between the headline to core inflation spread and tradable commodities. We 
subsequently intend to exploit this link in three ways: Firstly by devising an efficient strategic 
allocation using core inflation forecasts to determine the commodities’ natural weight in the 
portfolio as dictated by our macro approach. Secondly by testing a tactical allocation strategy 
which would time the inflation pass-through cycle to dynamically determine the optimal share 
of commodities in the allocation. And finally by proposing a strategy to arbitrage core 
inflation-linked derivatives by cross-replicating them with commodity portfolios. In light of 
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those results, one could still wonder whether headline indexation is suitable for all investors 
since its mean reverts to core inflation in the medium term. Should some investors opt for a 
reference swap for their liabilities? 
 
Swapping Headline for Core Inflation  
Longer-term investors exposed to inflation during the financial crisis probably felt stuck 
between anvil and hammer as in the short run, surging commodity prices pushed their 
inflation-linked liabilities higher while their assets dwindled in mark-to-market as a result of 
falling equity and other alternative fair values. Meanwhile, persistently low nominal rates and 
even negative real rates threatened the stability of their balance sheet in the longer run. To a 
certain degree, this asset-liability gap could be closed with the alternative inflation hedging 
techniques previously exposed. Yet, deviating from the most plain vanilla assets to embark on 
the world of either structured solutions as proposed in (Fulli-Lemaire, A Dynamic Inflation 
Hedging Trading Strategy, 2012) or through a refined use of alternative asset classes as in 
(Fulli-Lemaire, An Inflation Hedging Strategy with Commodities: A Core Driven Global 
Macro, 2013) is certainly not risk-free even though it offers a certain degree of risk 
mitigation. Be it in the portfolio insurance scheme or the pass-through partial hedging 
technique, both of these solutions incorporate an increased reliance on risky asset classes such 
as commodities which can at times experience brutal swings in value. The rollercoaster ride 
that commodity investors have gone through in the last decade is particularly enlightening on 
the dangers of such endeavors. Considering the macroeconomic paradigm shift exposed in the 
second chapter, and in particular the muted response of core inflation to exogenous 
commodity price shocks and the mean reversal of headline to core inflation yielding a lower 
relative volatility for the latter, it raises the question of whether we should invest in headline 
inflation-linked investments at all. That is obviously only the case if we can bear to hold our 
investment for a sufficiently long period of time for the pass-through cycle to operate fully.  
In other words, not all inflation hedgers should be treated equals as long-term players 
with investment horizons that extend beyond that of the expected duration of the mean-
reverting process should choose to target core inflation despite their headline inflation 
liabilities. The pass-through cycle rarely exceeds five years and seems to have even been 
shortened in the last decade compared to the average duration of pension funds’ investment 
horizons which can extend to several decades. This liability duration criteria therefore draws a 
wedge between long-term and short-term inflation hedgers as the former should seek core 
inflation protection while the latter should strive to obtain a headline inflation hedge. The 
obvious pitfall of this methodology is that to this date, no core inflation-linked asset exists. 
Deutsche Bank (Li & Zeng, 2012) recently announced the launch of an investable proxy for 
core inflation which paves the way for an outright core-linked market which would be the 
equivalent of the headline-linked market that materialized at the turn of the last century in the 
US, a little over a decade after its British counterpart appeared. 
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Exhibit 7: The volatility spread between headline and core inflation in the US. 
 
 
To make-up for the lack of an investable asset, we could go forward by imagining a 
core versus headline inflation swap that would see long-term players receive a fixed rate for 
the spread between headline and core inflation and short-term players be on the other end of 
the trade (Fulli-Lemaire & Palidda, Swapping Headline for Core Inflation: An Asset Liability 
Management Approach, 2012). Long-term players would most obviously have to roll swaps 
in order to have a continuous cover which maturity cannot extend beyond the one of short-
term players. Since core inflation is particularly sluggish over short horizons, we are 
particularly focusing on the strategy that would see long-term players invest in linkers 
whereas short-term players would invest in nominal bonds and both parties would engage on 
opposite sides of the inflation spread fixed-for-float rate swap. Long-term players would 
obtain a real rate and a core floor plus a fixed risk premium while short-term players would 
achieve a nominal return minus a fixed rate and a volatile-inflation-part hedge. They would 
still remain at risk on the core inflation part which looks like a reasonable risk for short to 
medium maturities but should benefit from much higher real returns as a result of this 
accepted risk. This approach would offer both a synthetic core-linked asset for long-term 
hedgers and offer enhanced returns for short-term hedgers. Their demand for inflation hedges 
is currently severely curtailed by extremely low real rates at the maturity they could invest in. 
In essence, it yields an intermediated commodity investment for short-term players which 
would boost their return on a risk-adjusted basis. The second additional benefit of this new 
derivative would be the onset of a market curve for core inflation that could be derived from 
the trading of these swaps and enable easy mark-to-market valuation of other core-linked 
securities in balance sheets, therefore also easing the way for future issuances of truly core-
linked assets in the primary market. The last hurdle these products would face is the potential 
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disequilibria between the potential demand from long-term and short-term players, the former 
probably massively outweighing the latter. Any supply and demand market disequilibrium 
between long-term sellers of headline inflation and short-term sellers of core inflation could 
be matched by the intermediation of market makers which could price the derivative based on 
the cross hedging potential of commodities since we have also showed in (Fulli-Lemaire, An 
Inflation Hedging Strategy with Commodities: A Core Driven Global Macro, 2013) that the 
inflation spread is highly co-integrated with commodity indices. 
 
Conclusion 
As the “perfect financial storm” (Blanchard O. , 2009) receded, its aftermath revealed a 
profoundly changed macroeconomic landscape to which investors have yet to adapt. The risk 
managers of institutional investors are not exempt as the nature of both their assets and their 
liabilities have been profoundly altered by those events: the liability side of their balance 
sheet suddenly appeared more dangerous as the inflation risk surged while their asset side 
dwindled as a result of dismal market performances and dangerously low real rates. Those 
joint forces jeopardize their long-term stability and thereby threaten their very existence. This 
year witnessed pension funds in the UK going under as they were in a stranglehold over the 
asset-liability gap. It is then high time we rethink inflation hedging before we find ourselves 
“stuck between a rock and a hard place” and this paper provides three possible ways: 
The first alternative proposed here consists in adapting current structured solutions in 
the form of portfolio insurance to provide additional cover for the inflation risk. The (Fulli-
Lemaire, A Dynamic Inflation Hedging Trading Strategy, 2012) offers a way of completely 
relaxing our dependency on linkers. Though its deployment is currently curtailed by the 
extremely low if not negative real rates currently prevailing throughout industrialized 
countries left in the investment grade club as a result of the flight to quality phenomenon 
currently gripping  fixed-income markets. A make-up solution could be found in a partial 
relaxation of the dependency on linkers by devising a CPPI based on real bonds, thereby 
offering enhanced real returns with an inflation floor as in the iCPPI of (Graf, Haertel, Kling, 
& Ruß, 2012). This hybrid class of structured products would not be constrained by the level 
of real rates and would reduce the share of linkers as compared to the current fully hedged 
portfolio strategies. It would ideally complement the DIHTS when market conditions hinder 
its inception. 
The second alternative explored here aims at exploiting current advances in 
macroeconomic to allocate commodities in inflation protected portfolios. As the impact of 
commodities on headline inflation increased while its linkage with core inflation seem to have 
disappearance altogether in the early nineties, it generates opportunities for strategically 
optimizing our commodity investments depending on the pass-through cycle of headline 
inflation mean reverting to its core anchor as espoused by (Fulli-Lemaire, An Inflation 
Hedging Strategy with Commodities: A Core Driven Global Macro, 2013). 
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The third and last alternative proposed here consists in drawing a wedge between long-
term and short-term inflation hedgers in order to differentiate their optimal hedging 
investment between headline and core linked assets. Following the premises of a core-linked 
inflation market born out of the issuance of the first investable US core inflation proxy by 
Deutsche-Bank (Li & Zeng, 2012), (Fulli-Lemaire & Palidda, Swapping Headline for Core 
Inflation: An Asset Liability Management Approach, 2012) propose a swap to optimally 
transfer the reference mismatch between our two classes of investors. It would be a make-up 
solution for the lack of outright core-linked assets for long-term investors and a way to 
enhance the real return of short-term investors at the same time. Were such core-linked 
markets to develop, we would have to rewrite the current asset liability management practices 
to reflect this shift. We could in particular envisage shifting long-term liabilities such as 
pension contracts towards a core benchmark since a regime change would at worst bring core 
inflation back more closely in line with its headline counterpart as it was previously. 
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